

THE SCIENTIFIC ADVISOR
U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

2 May 51

Mr Boyd

For your info

ATCG-S


26 Apr 91

MEMORANDUM FOR GEN Foss

SUBJECT: Principles of War--Sun Tzu, The Art of War

1. I recently reread Sun Tzu, The Art of War to freshen my memory before commenting on drafts of FM 100-5 and other documents that will institutionalize AirLand Operations (if the Scientific Advisor may be permitted to also advise on Military Science).
2. Attached is a copy of key points I selected from Sun Tzu that may be of interest and use to you. It is incredible how "modern" is his advice; truly ageless principles of war. I recommend that this book be required reading for every field grade officer.
3. I have put stars by those points that I recommend be clearly articulated early in the new FM 100-5 because I believe they are particularly important and relevant to AirLand Operations (Nonlinear Warfare).
4. In reviewing the Principles of War in FM 100-5 and comparing them with the Principles of War of some other nations assembled by John Boyd (Atch 2), some of the listed principles do not seem to be necessary, and some fundamental principles, given by Sun Tzu and others, are not listed. Those not listed are deception, initiative, concentration, speed, morale, and freedom of action. I recommend that the Army consider replacing "offensive" with "initiative," and "mass" and "economy of force" with "concentration," as well as including some of the others in the list. While Sir A. P. Wavell may be correct in saying "I would give you warning on the principles of war...They are all simply common sense, and are instinctive to the well trained soldier," I believe the Army ought to improve the list because common sense is uncommon. In addition, the FM 100-5 descriptions of "offensive," "mass," and "economy of force" are already consistent with the recommended change.

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PAUL J. BERENSON
Scientific Advisor

SUN TZU: THE ART OF WAR

(Key Points Selected by Paul J. Berenson, 1991)

FOREWORD

Sun Tzu's essays on "The Art of War" form the earliest of known treatises on the subject, but have never been surpassed in comprehensiveness and depth of understanding.

--concentrated essence of wisdom on the conduct of war.

Only Clausewitz is comparable.

Sun Tzu was introduced to the West shortly before the French Revolution (date of composition during the fourth century B.C.)

"there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited."

"the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting."

Emphasis on doing the unexpected and pursuing the indirect approach.

In that one short book was embodied almost as much about the fundamentals of strategy and tactics as I had covered in more than twenty books.

B. H. LIDDELL HART

PREFACE

His purpose was to guide rulers and generals in the intelligent prosecution of successful war.

Moral, intellectual, and circumstantial elements of war to be more important than the physical.

planning-- information-- speedy decision

"No country has ever benefited from a protracted war."

Decisive influence of supply on the conduct of operations.

"the victorious army attacks a demoralized and defeated enemy."

The strategic and tactical doctrines are based on deception to mystify and delude the enemy, the indirect approach, ready adaptability to the enemy situation, flexible and coordinated maneuver, and speedy concentration against points of weakness.

S. B. GRIFFITH

INTRODUCTION

S. B. Griffith

SUN TZU ON WAR

War is a grave concern of the state; it must be thoroughly studied.

War was to be preceded by measures designed to make it easy to win.

Armed force was to be applied so that victory was gained: in the shortest possible time; at the least possible cost in lives and effort; with infliction on the enemy of the fewest possible casualties.

National unity was deemed by Sun Tzu to be an essential requirement of victorious war.

All warfare is based on deception.

An indispensable preliminary to battle was to attack the mind of the enemy.

Attacks cities only when there is no alternative.

Victory is the object of war.

No country has ever benefited from a protracted war.

The expert commander strikes only when the situation assures victory. To create such a situation is the ultimate responsibility of generalship.

direct or "cheng" force, indirect or "ch'i" force

Define the "cheng" element as fixing and the "ch'i" as flanking or encircling, or, again, as the force(s) of distraction and the force(s) of decision. Engage with the "cheng" but to win with the "ch'i."

A general unable to use ground properly was unfit to command.

SUN TZU AND MAO TSE-TUNG

Those deprived of the initiative usually lose.

The principle which should govern all military operations: avoid all passive and inflexible methods.

The nature of war is ceaseless change.

Operations require continuous review and readjustment.

Deception and surprise are two key principles.

TRANSLATION OF SUN TZU

I. ESTIMATES

War is a matter of vital importance to the State.

It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.

Five fundamental factors: moral influence; weather; terrain; command; doctrine.

Command is the general's qualities of wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage, and strictness.

All warfare is based on deception.

II. WAGING WAR

When troops attack cities, their strength will be exhausted.

There has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited.

When a country is impoverished by military operations it is due to distant transportation.

What is essential in war is victory, not prolonged operations.

III. OFFENSIVE STRATEGY

Generally, in war the best policy is to take a state intact.

What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy.

The supreme excellence in war is to attack the enemy's plans.

Next best is to disrupt his alliances.

The next best is to attack his army.

The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative.

Those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle.

They conquer by strategy.

He whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious.

Know the enemy and know yourself. Know the ground, know the weather.

IV. DISPOSITIONS

Thus a victorious army wins its victories before seeking battle; an army destined to defeat fights in the hope of winning.

VI. WEAKNESSES AND STRENGTHS

Go into emptiness, strike voids, bypass what he defends, hit him where he does not expect you.

An army manages its victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy.

If I am able to determine the enemy's dispositions while at the same time I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide.

The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle he must be prepared in a great many places.

When he prepares everywhere he will be weak everywhere.

The ultimate in disposing one's troops is to be without ascertainable shape.

VII. MANEUVER

Nothing is more difficult than the art of maneuver.

Both advantage and danger are inherent in maneuver.

War is based on deception.

When campaigning, be swift.

Create in his mind the idea that there is an alternative to death. Then strike.

XI. THE NINE VARIETIES OF GROUND

Lay on many deceptive operations.

Speed is the essence of war.

When the enemy presents an opportunity, speedily take advantage of it.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

<u>USA</u>	<u>United Kingdom</u>	<u>Soviet Union</u>	<u>France</u>
• Objective	• Aim/Goal	• Mobility/Tempo	• Concentration of Efforts
• Offensive	• Coordination	• Concentration	• Freedom of Action
• Mass	• Offensive	• Surprise	• Economy of Forces
• Economy of Forces	• Freedom of Action	• Combat Activeness	
• Maneuver	• Concentration	• Preservation of Combat Effectiveness	
• Unity of Command	• Economy of Efforts	• Conformity of Goal/Plan to Actual Situation	
• Security	• Surprise	• Coordination/Interworking	
• Surprise	• Security		
• Simplicity	• Morale		
	• Control of Rear		

CRITIQUE

- A list of principles does not reveal how individual principles interact nor the mechanism for doing so.
- Scientific laws and principles are the same for all countries and tend to change little over time. On the other hand, we note that the Principles of War are different for different countries and change more dramatically over time. Furthermore, they do not make evident the importance of variety/rapidity/harmony/initiative as basis to shape and adapt to circumstances—a necessary requirement for success in the uncertain and everchanging environment of conflict or war.
- This would suggest that the principles are not principles. Instead, they seem to be some kind of a (shifting) static check of laundry list of what should be adhered to.

6 May 91

MEMORANDUM FOR GEN Foss

SUBJECT: AirLand Operations: Proposed Changes to Mar 91 Draft
TRADOC Pam 525-5b

1. The draft of TRADOC Pam 525-5b is excellent conceptually. Included in the enclosed markup are some proposed changes to improve clarity. The draft also needs editing to eliminate redundancy.

2. The changes proposed generally follow from the 26 April Memo I sent you on the Principles of War, and the 18 April Memo on the word Synchronization.

a. I have deleted the word "synchronization" in many places because it emphasizes simultaneous action and implies tight control, which is different from the Army meaning. Harmonization is used in some places, which is a better word, and I have replaced synchronization with synergetic in other places.

b. In many places, I have added the words speed or rapidity because they are key elements in maintaining the initiative, demoralizing the adversary and winning. The key is to operate at a faster tempo than our adversary.

c. I recommend that the AirLand Operations documents say "victory" or "winning" when that is what is meant rather than "decisive operations or results." "Decisive results" can also be negative, as Napoleon found at Waterloo. I have proposed this change in many places, including the names of the Operational Stages, which you may be reluctant to change. Making the changes proposed in the text will probably be sufficient.

d. Emphasize the importance of freedom of action, and the fact that air superiority is the first requirement for freedom of action.

e. Emphasize the importance of morale and moral victories in destroying the adversary psychologically prior to the physical battle. In general, I recommend there be more emphasis on magnifying the adversary's "friction," and attacking the adversary psychologically by increasing his uncertainty, doubt, and fear to slow his reactions (ideally paralyzing him into inaction), ensuring we maintain the initiative.


f. In line with this, increase the emphasis on deception and surprise.

TCG-S

SUBJECT: AirLand Operations, TRADOC Pam 525-5

3. I applaud the change from AirLand Battle to AirLand Operations because the doctrine should emphasize the overall operation that establishes the conditions for victory, rather than just the battle.

4. The proposed changes concentrate on improving the wording, rather than reducing the length. Because many of the changes suggested depart from standard Army terminology to what I believe are more accurate or otherwise better phrases, they probably will not be accepted by your drafter unless you personally approve the change. Enclosed is my original markup of the PAM 525-5 draft so you can review it and indicate what proposed changes you wish adopted.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Paul".

PAUL J. BERENSON
Scientific Advisor

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